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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
Computers are used widely for the storage of large volumes of
data. Most data stored is not in the public domain as it contains
either vital business/governmental/military information or
confidential information about individuals. The violation of privacy
of an individual is "making such information available to others . .
.
without his or her consent ..." [FELL72] . Consequently, the issue of
data security is of great concern to the owners of databases and has
been receiving great attention from researchers over the last two
decades. According to Miranda [MIRA80] , data security is of greater
importance in database management systems than in any other software
because it can be changed and also because data access is made
available to many via powerful and convenient user interfaces
.
Two kinds of security control can be imposed. One is external
security control in which personnel and physical access to the
computer is limited. The second kind of control is internal security
control. It is in this type of control that abuse by authorized
sophisticated computer users must be restricted or denied.
Internal security mechanisms were surveyed by Denning and Denning
[DENN79b]
.
They discuss four areas of internal security control:
access controls, flow controls, inference controls and cryptographic
controls. All these controls involve regulating the operations of a
computer system. Access controls regulate modification of data and
programs. Flow controls regulate flow of information from one object
to another. Inference controls regulate the inference of confidential
information from statistical databases. Cryptographic controls
regulate the encryption of the data stored in a computer system or
those transmitted on communication lines. Considerable research has
and is being done in each of the above areas.
Although the above security controls are all equally important
and interesting, the focus of this work is in the area of inference
control in statistical databases. Statistical databases provide
statistical information such as frequency counts, means, medians,
sums, ..., etc, of a certain subset of data in a given population.
The objective is that no confidential information about a particular
individual is revealed but good statistical population measures can be
obtained. However, users can often deduce (or infer) confidential
information from the statistical information. This type of compromise
is very difficult to control because the database is compromised by
legitimate queries. Such compromise is effected through the use of
trackers, logical formulas and a process of manipulating data obtained
from a few overlapping subsets of records.
The exact nature of this form of compromise, the previous
research done in the areas of avoiding this form of compromise and to
making such compromise very difficult is discussed in Chapter II. It
must be noted however that all the methods proposed to date either
have flaws in that the database is still susceptible to compromise or
are very expensive to implement. The present research is an attempt
to find a relatively inexpensive solution to the problem of preventing
the compromise of an individual's privacy via inferential methods from
a statistical database.
Chapter II
LITERATURE SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
Any survey on databases must begin with the specification of the
database model. The terms in this work are defined and examples are
provided to clarify these definitions. The database in Denning,
Denning and Schwartz [DENN79a] was chosen as a basis for most of the
examples in this study. This database which contains information
about employees in a hypothetical university's College of Mathematical
Sciences is shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1. Database Containing Information On Employees in a
Hypothetical University's College of Mathematical Sciences.
No. Name Sex Dept Position Salary Political
Contribution
1 Adams M CS Prof 20 50
2 Baker M Math Prof 15 100
3 Cook F Math Prof 25 200
4 Dodd F CS Prof 15 50
5 Engel M Stat Prof 18
6 Flynn F Stat Prof 22 150
7 Grady M CS Adm 10 20
8 Hayes M Math Prof 18 500
9 Irons F CS Stu 3 10
10 Jones M Stat Adm 20 15
11 Knapp F Math Prof 25 100
12 Lord M CS Stu 3
DATABASE MODEL
A statistical database is a collection of records for each
entity. An entity is a "thing that exists and is distinguishable"
[ULLM82]. In the database of Table 2.1, each correspondent (or
individual) is an entity. The database contains information about 12
individuals (sometimes referred to as the size of the database)
.
Entities have properties called attributes . In our example, Name,
Sex, Dept, Position, Salary and Political contributions are all
attributes. Each attribute has many possible values in its domain.
The possible values for each of the attributes (or the domains) are:
Name : a character string
Sex : M, F
Dept : CS, Math, Stat
Position : Prof, Adm, Stu
Salary : any integer >=
Political contribution : any integer >-
An attribute or a set of attributes whose values uniquely
identify each entity is called a key . In the above example, the
attribute "Name" is a key. Information about any particular
individual is considered confidential and consequently keys are not
considered to be part of statistical databases. However, an
individual's record can possibly be identified by another group of
attributes. For example, Dodd could be specified by having the values
F, CS and Prof for the attributes Sex, Dept and Position respectively.
We can also view the database records to contain category and
data fields [DENN78]. In the above example, the attributes Sex, Dept
and Position may be considered as category fields (the values do not
represent numerical data) . The attributes Salary and Political
contribution are data fields (the values are numerical data).
A query is a question which can be asked about a database.
Queries could be of two forms : key specified and characteristic
specified
. Key specified queries request statistics for a set of
individuals identified by keys. It would be useful, at this point, to
present the model proposed by Kam and Ullman [KAMU77] and Chin
[CHIN78]. They view a statistical database as a function f from
strings of k bits (called the key) to integers. In Chin's model, the
range of f is an ordered pair {0,1} x R. indicates that there are
no records with the specified keys in the database, and a 1 indicates
that there are records with the specified keys in the database. The
value/result of the query is a real number (R) . The database about
employees in the hypothetical university above could be represented by
keys consisting of 25 bits abbccddddddeeeeeeeeeeeeee interpretted as:
(1) a is the Sex of the individual; 0=M, 1-F
(2) bb is the Dept; 00-CS , 01- Math, 10-Stat
(3) cc is the Position; 00-Prof, 01-Adm, 10=Stu
(4) dddddd is the Salary
(5) eeeeeeeeeeeeee is the Political contribution
The database is queried by specifying some of the bits and leaving the
others unspecified. An unspecified bit is denoted by a *. For
example, if the only queries allowed are the queries on salaries, the
sum of the salaries of all males in the CS department could be
obtained from the query:
000**********************
To find the sum of the salary of all female Professors with a
contribution of $100, the query would be:
1**00******00000001100100
It is easily seen that this is very cumbersome and consequently not
very popular. Therefore, the model considered in this work deals with
characteristic specified queries. However, it must be mentioned that
using the above model, Kam and Ullman [KAMU77] and Chin [CHIN78]
guarantee that the database is secure (definition of which appears
later). For a database of this nature, one can only ask queries
involving either the operators SUM or COUNT.
Characteristic specified queries, q(C) , uses a characteristic
formula C to group records in a database. A characteristic formula is
a logical formula over the values of category fields. This logical
formula uses boolean operators: and (&) , or (+) and not ("). The
operands are values of category fields. For example:
C = (Sex=M) & (Dept=CS)
is a characteristic formula which specifies all males in the CS
department. The set of records which satisfy a characteristic formula
C is called a query set
. X The size of the query set is denoted by
|X
C |. Records corresponding to Adams, Grady and Lord would satisfy
the characteristic formula C = ( (Sex=M)&(Dept=CS) ) and hence would be
members of the query set X of size three. To give another example,
Dodd is the only member of the query set Xr (of size one) for the
characteristic formula:
C = (Sex=F) & (Dept-CS) & (Position-Prof)
The characteristic specified queries q(C) can take many forms
[DENN78]. Some of the forms are:
COUNT(C) - |X
C |, where |XC | is the size of the query set X
satisfying the characteristic formula C. (1)
SUM(C;j) = 2_ v.
.
, where v.. is a data field j of record i. (2)
ieX
c
« lJ
- Sum of all the values in the data field j for all
individuals satisfying C.
select(C;j) = select v where select is MEDIAN, SMALLEST,
C J
LARGEST, MEAN etc. (3)
=» MEDIAN, SMALLEST, LARGEST or MEAN of the data
fields j for all individuals satisfying C.
The COUNT and SUM queries can be written in a more general from
[DENN79a] as:
q(C;j,m) = E. vm (4)
ieX
Q
«
where
m = for the COUNT query,
and m - 1 for the SUM query.
Examples of some characteristic specified queries are:
COUNT((Sex=M) & (Dept=CS))) = 3
- Number of males in the CS
department.
SUM ((Sex-M) & (Dept=CS); Salary) = 33K
- sum of the salaries of all males in
the CS department.
MEDIAN ((Sex-M) & (Dept=CS) ; Salary) - 10K
- median of the salaries of all males
in the CS department.
SUM ((Sex=M) & (Dept=CS); Political Contribution) = $70
- sum of the political contributions
of all males in the CS department.
COMPROMISE
As mentioned earlier, the aim of a statistical database is to
provide statistical information about a group of individuals without
revealing information about any specific individual. The example
below shows how a user can deduce information from the database of
Table 2.1 about an individual, say Dodd. If the user has pre-
knowledge that Dodd is a female Professor in the CS department and
wants to find Dodd's salary, the user could first ask the query:
COUNT ((Sex-F) & (Dept-CS) & (Position=Prof )
)
The user would now conclude that Dodd is the only one with the above
characteristics because the response to the above query is one. It is
now quite trivial to deduce Dodd's salary. The query to determine
Dodd's salary would be:
SUM ((Sex-F) & (Dept-CS) & (Position-Prof); Salary)
Since information about an individual (Dodd in this case) was not
known previously and has been deduced, compromise or disclosure is
said to have taken place. More formally, compromise or disclosure
occurs when one can gather information which is not previously known
about an individual from one or more queries.
Most databases do not answer all queries. As an example, the
query SUM(C;j) may not be supported/permitted by some databases. Even
when queries such as SUM(C;j) are not allowed, a user can still deduce
information (say salary) about an individual (Dodd). The scheme to do
this was given by Hoffman and Miller [HOFF70]. Once it is established
that the characteristic C - ((Sex-F) & (Dept-CS) & (Position-Prof))
identifies Dodd, the user could check if Dodd's salary is any value
(say $20K)
. This query would be:
COUNT( (Sex-F) & (Dept-CS) & (Position-Prof) & (Salary-20))
A response of indicates that Dodd does not earn $20K. The user
could infer the exact salary of $15K when the response to a query is
one. In this example, the query would be:
COUNT ((Sex-F) &(Dept-CS) & (Position-Prof) & (Salary-15))
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Compromise still seems to have taken place when a user deduces
that Dodd does not earn $20K because the user did not have this
information earlier. This kind of compromise in which it is revealed
that an individual does not have a particular value in one of the data
fields of that individual is called negative compromise . In a
positive compromise
. it is revealed that an individual has a
particular data value in one of the fields of that individual's
record. For example, deducing that Dodd's salary is $15K is positive
compromise.
Complete compromise occurs when one deduces everything in the
database. Partial compromise occurs if deductions regarding some
individuals can be made but the entire database is not deduced.
Further, if no positive or negative compromise can occur in a
database, then the database is strongly secure
. If only negative
compromise can occur in a database then the database is weakly secure
.
Since databases can be compromised, many queries on the database
are not allowed. Queries that are permitted by the database are
permitted queries, otherwise they are restricted queries
. Schlorer
[SCHL80] distinguishes the knowledge a user possesses because of
permitted queries (working knowledge ) from the knowledge a user
learns/possesses from "anything which cannot be learned from publicly
available system discription plus normal statistical evaluation"
(supplementary knowledge )
. It must be pointed out that it is very
difficult to know exactly how much supplementary knowledge a user
11
possesses. It may be reasonable to assume that for the database of
Table 2.1, a user would know the sex, department and position of an
individual
.
Disclosure could be of two types [SCHL80, HAQ75]: statistical
disclosure and personal disclosure . Statistical disclosure occurs if
a user learns a restricted statistical quantity. Statistical
disclosure could either be resultant disclosure (when only working
knowledge is used) or external disclosure (when supplementary
knowledge must be used) . Personal disclosure occurs when a user gains
a piece of new information about an individual.
PROTECTION MECHANISMS
It was seen earlier that compromise/disclosure is possible from
statistical databases. Before any protection mechanisms are
presented, one must look into the various ways in which data is
distributed to the users. Once the means of dissemination are
identified, mechanisms to prevent disclosure can be presented.
Fellegi [FELL77] pointed out three kinds of dissemination programs:
(1) Printed publications
(2) Public use of tapes
(3) Custom-made retrievals or query-based statistical outputs
[SCHL83b]
Although these dissemination programs seem to be different, the
security problems in all the above dissemination programs are similar.
The mechanisms for protection apply to all three dissemination
12
programs. Greater emphasis would however be put on query-based
statistical outputs. The reason is that printed publications and
tapes are planned dissemination programs. One can either control,
restrict or control and restrict the amount of information published.
Custom-made retrievals are made on multi-purpose databases and the
consequences of this are [FELL77]
:
(1) The information in the public domain increases.
(2) Each answered query represents a potential risk in
compromising the database for future retrievals.
There are possibly many ways to categorize the protection
mechanisms [PALM74, SCHL83b, DENN78, DENN80b]. Basically, there are
two possibilities regarding the storage of data in the database:
(1) Dummy/modified data is stored in the database.
(2) Actual data is stored in the database.
The strategies for protection against compromise change with the
way in which the data is stored. Hence, they are considered
seperately.
STORAGE OF DUMMY DATA IN THE DATABASE
In this scheme, actual data is not stored in the database. There
are three basic schemes for modifying the database:
(1) Micro -aggregation
(2) Random modification of data
(3) Data Swapping
13
Micro -aggregation
In micro-aggregation, individuals with similar characteristics
are grouped together to form single "aggregate individuals" [FEIG70].
These "aggregate individuals" replace the actual data. Statistics are
computed for these aggregates rather than the real ones
.
Questions do arise as to how much to aggregate and which
individuals need to be chosen for aggregation. It was rightly pointed
out by Feige and Watts [FEIG70] that the cost of aggregation must be
measured in terms of the usefulness of the aggregated data for
research purposes. They examined the usefulness of this data when
they were taken as inputs to regression analysis. When the regression
model is known in advance, it is possible to devise grouping schemes
that avoid disclosure of individual microdata and still maintain the
property that the grouped estimators are unbiased. It seems quite
unreasonable to expect the knowledge of the regression model for query
based databases
.
For published data (such as printed publications and public use
of tapes), this strategy could probably be implemented at a high cost.
For multipurpose data which allows custom-made retrievals, this
strategy is almost impossible to implement. The database is usually
not static. Modifications may be made continuously to the database.
Under such circumstances, the choice of individuals for aggregations
may need continuous change. The cost of this evaluation after every
modification of the database can be prohibitive and hinder the
usefulness of the database.
14
Random modification of the data
In this strategy, some of the data could be modified at random
and stored. Reed [REED73] related security in data banks with
information theory. He defined a privacy transformation T which
transformed each record as it was saved for use in data banks.
Associated with each element in the privacy transform T, was a
probability P, . Each record was transformed to a new value which
depended both on the privacy transform and the associated
probabilities. This transformation can also be applied to the data
every time it is retrieved from storage. The data stored could be the
actual data itself. The cost of doing this is going to be large since
the transformation is applied to each record.
More recently, Traub, Yemeni and Wozniakowski [TRAU84] suggested
that instead of storing the actual record, a record distorted by a
random perturbation vector be stored. The components of the
perturbation vector are random with a mean zero. For example, in the
database of Table 2.1, the values of salary and political contribution
for Dodd could be stored as $14K and $53 respectively. A problem with
this method is that there could be queries which could result in large
errors. This could easily happen if the user chooses a group of
records for which all perturbations are on one side of the mean and
therefore the resultant error for all the records grouped together may
be unacceptable. A suggestion by the authors was to monitor the error
and to take appropriate action when it exceeded a certain threshold.
15
This strategy would require storage of the actual data also. The cost
of storing both the actual as well as the perturbed data could be
large and therefore maybe unacceptable for most organizations.
Data Swapping
In multidimensional transformation or data swapping, the values
of fields of records are interchanged [SCHL81] . The data field in a
record for any particular individual need not be correct. In a sense,
the database is transformed to a new database. Data swapping
therefore reduces the risk of compromise. However, there is no
efficient way of finding which records are to be used for data
swapping.
For example, in the database of Table 2.1, one could swap the
salaries of Adams and Dodd because they are both professors in the CS
department. A question could be raised, however, as to why a swap is
made between individuals of opposite sexes. The determination of
which records to use in a swapping operations is not a trivial process
and can be very costly.
STORAGE OF ACTUAL DATA IN THE DATABASE
In these schemes, the actual data is stored in the database.
While presenting the data, or while answering queries, two control
strategies can be implemented:
(1) Output restriction techniques:
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A query is answered or a value published only if some
conditions are satisfied. However, the response is
always the true value. Some of the techniques are:
(i) Cell suppression techniques
(ii) Controls on the size of the query set.
(iii) Controls on the overlap of queries.
(iv) Table restrictions
(2) Output perturbation techniques
In these techniques the answer to the query or the
value to be published is perturbed from the true value.
There are two categories of perturbation techniques:
(i) Record based perturbations
(ii) Rounding techniques
Cell suppression techniques
These techniques are popular among the census agencies [COX75,
COX77, COX79, COX80, JABI77, ZEIS77] where the dissemination programs
are printed publications or public use tapes. The published data are
viewed as tables. These tables consist of cells . Under cell
suppression techniques, all cells identified as disclosure cells (or
sensitive cells) are suppressed from publication. A cell is
considered sensitive if an unacceptable estimate of the value of the
data cell is made from the data. Merely suppressing sensitive cells
is not enough since users may find out what the sensitive cells are
17
and find the values of these cells by algebraic manipulation.
Therefore, related non-sensitive cells, called complementary
suppressions
. may also be suppressed from publication. The non-
sensitive cells are chosen so as to ensure that no value of sensitive
cells may be derived from the published data.
It may be feasible to apply cell suppression for custom-made or
query based retrievals. This, however, needs further study [SCHL83b].
Controls on the size of the query set
Once it is established that a set of characteristics identifies a
specific individual, the database is easily compromised as shown in
earlier examples. It was shown for the database of table 2.1, that
Dodd's salary could be deduced from either of the queries:
SUM ((Sex-F) & (Dept-CS) & (Position-Prof); Salary)
COUNT ((Sex-F) & (Dept-CS) & (Position-Prof) & (Salary-15))
A simple solution to avoid identification of an individual could be to
have controls on the query size n for any characteristic formula C.
A query q(C) is answered only if the query size n is in the range
[k,N-k]
,
where k is a chosen parameter and N is the total number of
records in the database.
Although this seems to be a good idea, this control is easily
subverted by a tool called the tracker [DENN79a, SCHL75, SCHL80,
DENN80a]
.
A tracker is a set of characteristic formulas which help in
18
padding the query set of the original formula to form answerable
queries
.
Schlorer [SCHL75] considered the case where k was in the range
(l.N/2] and the query set size was in the range [k,N-k] . He
introduced the concept of an individual tracker . If a user wants to
find the answer to a query q(C) which is restricted, then, to deduce
q(C)
,
the user could find a split of C into disjoint sub-
characteristics A and B where C - A & B such that q(A & B) and q(A)
are both answerable. q(C) is then calculated from:
q(C) - q(A) - q(A & B) (5)
The formula T= A & B is called the individual tracker. To illustrate
the use of the individual tracker, consider the database of Table 2.1.
If a user knows that Dodd is identified uniquely by the
characteristic
:
C - (Sex-F) & (Dept-CS) & (Position-Prof)
and if only those queries whose size is in the range [2,10] (i.e. k-2)
are answered, then an unanswerable query q(C) is calculated from Eq.
(5) using the tracker T - A & B where A - (Sex-F) and B = ((Dept-CS)
and (Position-Prof)). In fact, Eq. (5) could be used to verify that
Dodd is the only individual with the characteristics given by C:
COUNT((Sex-F) & (Dept-CS) & (Position-Prof))
- COUNT(Sex-F) - COUNT (( Sex-F) &( (Dept-CS) "&" (PSsitI8n-Prof ) )
)
- 5-4
19
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It is to be noted that both q((Sex-F) & (Dept=CS"&"Position=Prof ) ) and
q(Sex-F) are permitted queries. To determine Dodd's Salary, Eq. (5)
can be applied utilizing the SUM query:
SUM((Sex«F) & (Dept=CS) & (Position-Prof); Salary)
= SUM(Sex=F; Salary) -SUM((Sex-F)&(Dept=CS)&(Position=Prof); Salary)
= $90K - $75K
- $15K
Individual trackers must be found for each individual for complete
compromise. A tracker called the general tracker applicable to all
individuals in the database was presented by Denning, Denning and
Schwartz [DENN79a]
.
A general tracker is any characteristic formula T whose query set
size is in the range [2k,N-2k] . Therefore, the value of k is
restricted to [0,n/4]. Any restricted query q(C) may be calculated
from:
q(C) = q(C+T) + q(C + f) - q(T) -q(T) if COUNT(C)<k (6a)
q(C) = 2q(T) + 2q(T) - q(C + T) - q(C + f) if COUNT(C)>N-k (6b)
It was shown that all the queries on the right hand side of Eq. (6)
were answerable. For example, if k-2 , then the general tracker must
have a query set size in the range [4,8] for the database of Table
2.1. A general tracker could be T=(Sex=M) since COUNT(T) is 7.
Dodd's salary can be determined from:
SUM((Sex-F)&(Dept=-CS)&(Position=Prof); Salary)
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- SUM(((Sex=F)&(Dept=CS)&(Position=Prof)) + (Sex=M); Salary) +
SUM(((Sex=F)&(Dept=CS)&(Position=Prof)) + (Sex-M) ; Salary) -
SUM((Sex=M); Salary) - SUM( (Sex=M) ; Salary)
- $119K + $90K - $104K - $90K
- $15K
There could be many general trackers. For example, T = (Dept=CS) is
also a general tracker since COUNT(T) is 5 and is in the range [4,8].
Denning, Denning and Schwartz [DENN79a] found an even more powerful
tracker called the double tracker. For a general tracker to be found,
k must be in the range [0,n/4]. In the case of a double tracker, k
needs to be in the range [0,n/3] . A double tracker is a pair of
characteristic formulas (T,U) satisfying:
h:- *V (7a)
COUNT(T) is in the range [k,N-2k] (7b)
COUNT(U) is in the range [2k,N-k] (7c)
Any restricted query q(C) is found from:
q(C) = q(U) + q(C+T) - q(T) - q(C&f&U) for COUNT(C)<k (8a)
q(C) = q(U) - q(C+T) + q(T) + q(C&T&U) for COUNT(C)>N-k (8b)
For example, if k=4, there cannot be any general tracker because of
range restrictions. However, (T,U) = ( (Dept-Math)
,
(Position-Prof ) ) is
a double tracker since it satisfies Eq. (7):
X^, = records of Baker, Cook, Hayes and Knapp
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X - records of Adams, Baker, Cook, Dodd, Engel, Flyrm, Hayes and
Knapp
C0UNT(T)=4 and is in the range [4,4]
C0UNT(U)-8 and is in the range [8,8]
To determine Dodd's salary:
SUM((Sex-F)&(Dept-CS)&(Position-Prof); Salary)
- SUM( (Position-Prof) ;Salary)+
SUM( ( (Sex-F)&(Dept-CS)&(Position-Prof ) )+(Dept-Math) ; Salary)
- SUM((Dept-Math); Salary)
- SUM((Sex-F)&(Dept=CS)&(Position-P^
(Position-Prof); Salary)
= $158K + $98K - $83K - $158K
- $15K
Clearly, trackers are powerful tools for disclosure. It was shown
that trackers can be discovered using only a few queries and in
addition that there are an abundance of trackers for most databases
[SCHL80, DENN80a]
.
It is therefore obvious that in order to avoid
disclosures by controlling the query set size, one would have to
severely restrict the range of allowable queries and this could render
the database useless for normal statistical processing.
Controls on the overlap of queries
22
It was seen in the discussion of the control of query set size
that equations involving trackers isolate a single record. The
queries in the right hand side of Eqs
. (5), (6) and (8) have many
records in common, and these queries are manipulated algebraically to
nullify the effect of these common records.
Davida et al. [DAVI78], Dobkin, Jones and Lipton [DOBK79], and
DeMillo, Dobkin and Lipton [DEMI78] have shown how a set of queries
with large overlap of records could be used to compromise the
database. In some databases, the response to a query is a weighted
sum of the elements in the query set. These weights are usually kept
secret. By a clever overlap of query sets, Schwartz, Denning and
Denning [SCHW79] have shown that the database can be compromised if
the user has sufficient information about the records in the database.
A strategy which would not allow compromise would be to stop the
overlap of records in queries. There are three ways of implementing
this strategy:
(1) Keeping history
(2) Implied queries
(3) Database partitioning
Keeping history
One way to stop overlap is to keep history of all the queries by
a user. The programs that monitor all requests to the system and keep
audit trials are called threat monitoring control programs [HOFF70]
.
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A technique for managing the past history of user's queries was given
by Chin and Ozsoyoglu [CHIN82]
.
A query is not answered if the number of records common to two
queries is more that a specified quantity. An implementation of this
approach is to check the number of records common to two consecutive
queries. If a user decides to intersperse the queries with dummy
queries, this implementation is easily subverted. Another
implementation could be to remember all the queries. The number of
queries to be monitored and compared can increase rapidly. However,
there is no guarantee that a user does not get the answers to the
queries by colluding with some of his/her cohorts. Another problem
could be that this restriction may hinder a genuine user from getting
needed information from the database.
Implied queries
Friedman and Hoffman [FRIE80] introduced the concept of an
implied query. For any query or a set of queries, the queries that
can be deduced are called implied queries. A query is answered only
if the query and its associated implied queries have query set sizes
in the range [k,N-k]
,
where k is a given parameter. For example, for
the database of Table 2.1:
a
x
= COUNT (Sex-M) = 7
a
2
= COUNT( (Sex-M) & (Dept=CS)) - 4
One can deduce
:
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a
3
= COUNT ((Sex-M) & (Dept=CS)) - a^^-a. = 3
Therefore, COUNT( (Sex=M)&(Dept=CS) ) is an implied query. Note that if
k was 4, the size of the query sets must be in the range [4,8] for a
query to be answerable. Thus, the query COUNT( (Sex=M)&(Dept=CS) ) is
not answerable. However, by knowing a., and a_ from allowable queries,
a- can be deduced.
In the method proposed by Friedman and Hoffman [FRIE80] , the
query COUNT( (Sex-M)&(Dept-CS) ) would also be restricted and therefore
unanswered, because the associated implied query COUNT ( (Sex=M)&
(Dept-CS)) has a value outside the range [4,8].
This approach avoids the difficulties due to history keeping.
Denning [DENN81] has shown that there is an exponential growth of the
number of implied queries as the number of specified attributes in a
query increases. She has also shown that this control would not
prevent deduction of sensitive statistics.
Database partitioning
Another approach to preventing compromise is to partition the
database into groups [YUCH77, SCHL83c]
. A database is partitioned
into mutually exclusive, non- overlapping record sets called "atomic
populations" [SCHL83c]. Each of the atomic populations must have
either no records or more than one record. A query is answered only
if its query set is a union of some of the atomic populations. The
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attributes used in the partitioning of the database must be used as
characteristic formulas in queries.
For example, the database of Table 2.1 could be partitioned into
the groups shown below:
Group Characteristic Members
Cook, Dodd, Irons, Knapp, Flynn1 (Sex-F)
2 (Sex-F)&
(Position-Prof)
3 (Sex=M) &
((Position=Stu) +
(Position-Adm))
Adams, Baker, Engel, Hayes
Grady, Jones, Lord
Only queries involving entire groups are allowed. For the
partitions given above, only queries whose query sets are subsets of
either group 1, 2 or 3 are allowed. Query sets whose members are in
the intersection of the member sets in different groups are not
allowed. Yu and Chin [YUCH77] showed that partitioning could prevent
compromise even when the database is being modified. The partitioning
will often result in either high information loss or serious
distortion of important statistical functions [SCHL83c]
.
Table restrictions
A table is defined by the set of characteristic attributes whose
values occur in a characteristic formula [SCHL83b]
. An m-table has m
attributes. A relative table size s
m
/N for an m-table is the ratio of
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the product of the domain sizes of the m- attributes that specify the
table and the total number of records in the database. For the
example of Table 2.1, N=-12 , since there are twelve records. For the
query:
SUM((Sex=F)&(Dept-CS)&(Position-Prof) ; Salary)
the table is a 3 -table because there are three attributes (Sex, Dept
and Position) in the characteristic formula. The absolute table size
is:
s
3
- |Sex| * |Dept| * |Position|
= 2*3*3
= 18
The domain sizes of Sex, Dept and Position are 2 (M and F) , 3 (CS,
Math, Stat) and 3 (Prof, Adm, Stu) respectively. The relative table
size would be s~/N - 1.5.
From empirical investigations, it was determined that for s /N in
nr
the range [0.01,0.1], the risk of identification of an individual from
actual databases were similar for a given table size. Thus, a
criterion of s
m
/N was used to estimate the risks of identification.
In the table restriction technique, for each query, the size of the
table is determined and the identification risk is extracted from a
look-up table. If the risk exceeds a predetermined (threshold)
quantity, the query is witheld. Table restriction does not eliminate
loss of information and the threshold value must be tuned for each
database
.
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Record based perturbations
There are two categories in this method for avoiding compromise:
(1) Random sample queries :
The records used to find the required statistic is not the
entire query set. There is a probability associated with
selecting any record from the query set. The sample of records
chosen from the query set is used to determine the statistic
[DENN80b]
.
The implementation is such that the same query will
result in the same statistic because the same records would be
chosen as a sample. If the selection of records were completely
random, the value of the statistic returned would be different
each time a user queries the database with the same query. The
user could then estimate the true value of the statistic by
querying the database several times with the same query.
This method works well for large databases but the cost
could be very high because the method requires checking each
record for inclusion in the sample.
(2) Random perturbation :
In the method proposed by Beck [BECK80] , each data item
used in calculating the statistic is perturbed. The perturbations
to each record could be varied independently. An implementation
which minimized the error involved in determining the statistic
was given. This method is expensive because the data value for
each record must be perturbed.
28
Rounding techniques
In these techniques, the true statistic is calculated and then
the final result is perturbed. There are many ways of doing this:
(1) Systematic rounding :
The final statistic is rounded to the closest integer
multiple of a given base. Fellegi and Phillips [FELL74] showed
how rounding to multiples of integers could be subverted in
printed publications.
Another variation of systematic rounding is to report a
range (e.g. 0-5, 5-10, ...). According to Karpinski [KARP70]
,
this is subverted if a user is allowed to add (or delete) records
to the database. A user can add/deleted records with known data
values till there is a change in the reported range. By
arithmetic manipulation, the user can now find the actual response
to the query that he/she was seeking. Even if modification of the
database is not allowed, as is the case in most statistical
databases, the database could still be compromised if a user has
knowledge of some of the data values in the database.
(2) Random rounding :
Fellegi and Phillips [FELL74] suggested random rounding for
published data. They rounded a table value to the nearest integer
multiple of a chosen number. There was a probability associated
with the rounding scheme. The choice of the rounding base was
discussed by Nargundkar and Saveland [NARG72]
.
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Chapter III
A NEW DETERRENT TO COMPROMISE
INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, various methods of compromise and the
means to avoid compromise were discussed. All the methods to avoid
compromise were either very expensive to implement or would let the
database be compromised under certain situations/conditions. In the
present study, a new scheme for avoiding compromise is presented.
In this investigation, compromise of an individual's confidential
information is considered. The present study can be extended to
consider the compromise of confidential information about groups of
individuals. In addition, compromise is assumed to occur if a user
can infer the exact value of any field of an individual's record in
the database. In the case of data fields of a record, statistical
compromise may also be defined. This study does not deal with
statistical compromise.
COMPROMISE AVOIDANCE STRATEGY
The proposed method is to report results from a set of records
which is obtained by duplicating/deleting a record from the query set.
The scheme is the following:
1. A query q(C) is answerable if the query set size, |q(C)|, is in
the range [k,N-k]
,
where k is a chosen parameter and N is the
total number of records in the database.
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2. If a query, q(C), is answerable, then one of the following three
options is chosen in order to report the results to the user:
a. The query response is calculated from the set of records
obtained after duplicating a record in the query set.
b. The query response is calculated from the set of records
formed by deleting a record from the query set.
c
.
The query response is the true value
.
3. The decision to choose one of the three options is random.
However, it is necessary that the two conditions below be
satisfied:
a. The same option must be chosen for any query with the same
query set.
b. If two queries result in the same query set, and if the
option chosen is to duplicate/delete a record, the same
record must be duplicated/deleted from the two query sets
regardless of the order in which the records are put
together in the query sets.
The reason for these restrictions is that a compromise would
occur if different options are chosen whenever the same query is
posed repeatedly to the database. An accurate estimate of the
true response would be the average of the all the responses
.
EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL TRACKERS
It would be of interest to see how the scheme proposed in the
current investigation responds to the problem of trackers. As
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mentioned earlier, any unanswerable query q(C) , where C identifies an
individual, can be made answerable if the characteristic C can be
split into two characteristics A and B such that q(A) and q(A&B) are
both answerable:
q(C) = q(A) - q(A&B)
The individual tracker is T = A&B.
For a statistical analysis of compromise from individual
trackers, the following assumptions were made:
1. The following probabilities were assumed:
P^ = Probability of choosing the option to duplicate a record in
the query set.
P2 = Probability of choosing the option to delete a record from
the query set.
P 3
" Probability of choosing the option to return the true
response.
2. Should the decision be to duplicate/delete a record, it was
assumed that it is equally likely that any of the records in the
query set be chosen for duplicating the record or for deleting
the record.
3. The data values in any data field for the records in a query set
were assumed to be distinct.
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Since the characteristic C identifies an individual, the query
set sizes |q(A)| and |q(A&B)| satisfy the following formula:
|q(A)| - |q(A&B)| + 1
Given the above assumptions, compromise can occur only if one of
the following conditions hold:
1. True values are returned for both q(A) and q(A&B).
2. The same record is duplicated from the query sets corresponding
to the queries q(A) and q(A&B)
.
3. The same record is deleted from the query sets corresponding to
the queries q(A) and q(A&B).
It is easy to see that should any of the above conditions be
false, the true value is not reported and compromise will not occur
unless the user knows the following:
1. The option taken when the response is given to his/her query.
2. The ordering of the records in the query sets.
3. The data values in the data fields of the records.
In this investigation it is assumed that the user does not have
such a large amount of information regarding the database. Under such
circumstances, the probability that a compromise occurs using the
individual tracker can be determined. Let p , p, and p be defined as
a rb r c
follows
:
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p - probability that true values are returned for the queries
q(A) and q(A&B)
.
= P3P3
2
= P 3
P^ = Probability that the same record in the query sets q(A) and
q(A&B) was duplicated.
~ P^-~
-V>i where n is the query set size for the query q(A) .
P
c
= Probability that the same record in the query sets q(A) and
q(A&B) was deleted.
P2'n ' p2 where n is the query set size for the query q(A)
The probability of compromise is:
P = p + p, + pra rb *c
2 12 2
- P 3
+ i cpi + P2>
To get an upper bound on the probability, n-1 has to be at least k for
the query q(A&B) to be answerable. Therefore:
P * p 3
+
kTl (Pi + &
Further, if the probabilities of duplicating/deleting a record are
equal (= p) , then:
P < (l-2p) 2 + 2p
2/(k+l)
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or
P < (4 + 2/(k+l))p 2 - 4p + 1
To lessen the possibility of compromise, P must be as small as
2possible. Therefore, the minimum value of the function (4+2/(k+l))p -
4p+l needs to be determined:
^ [(4+2/(k+l))p
2
-4p+l] =
or
k+1
P " 2k73
To check if the value obtained is a minimum, the second derivative of
2the function (4+2/(k+l))p -4p+l needs to be taken. The second
derivative is positive for all positive values of k, indicating that
the minimum value of the function is when p - (k+l)/(2k+3) . Table 3.1
gives the values of p and the upper bound for P for various values of
k.
Table 3.1. Values of p and upper bounds for P for various values
of k.
k P P
1 0.4000 0.2000
2 0.4286 0.1429
3
. 4444 0.1111
4 0.4545 0.0909
5 0.4762 0.0476
10 0.4878 0.0244
20 0.4884 0.0231
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From Table 3.1, it may be concluded that for large values of k,
the probability of deletion/duplication of a record should be high
(approximately 0.5) to keep the probability of compromise low.
EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST GENERAL TRACKERS
General trackers were discussed in the previous chapter. These
trackers could be used to obtain confidential information about all
individuals in a database. As mentioned earlier, a general tracker T
is a characteristic formula whose query set size is in the range
[2k,N-2k] where N is the number of records in the query set. Any
restricted query q(C) may be calculated from:
q(C) - q(C+T) + q(C+T) - q(T) - q(T) if C0UNT(C)<k
q(C) - q(T) + 2q(f) - q(C+T) - q(C+T) if C0UNT(C)>N-k
In order to obtain bounds on the probability of compromise, any
of the above two equations may be considered. However, for this
analysis, the case when C0UNT(C)<k is considered:
q(C) = q(C+T) + q(C+T) - q(T) - q(f) if C0UNT(C)<k
The same assumptions made in the analysis of the effectiveness of
the proposed method against individual trackers is made in this
analysis also.
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Compromise can occur in many different ways. This is best
summarized in Table 3.2. Each row in Table 3.2 represents the
conditions that must hold for compromise to occur.
Table 3.2. Conditions under which compromise can occur when
general trackers are used to compromise the database.
Group No. q(C+T) q(C+T) q(T) q(T)
A 1 t t t t
B 2 al t al t
B 3 t al al t
B 4 al t t al
B 5 t al t al
C 6 al a2 al a2
C 7 al a2 a2 al
C 8 dl d2 dl d2
C 9 dl d2 d2 dl
D 10 dl t dl t
D 11 t dl dl t
D 12 dl t t dl
D 13 t dl t dl
E 14 al d2 al d2
E 15 al d2 d2 al
E 16 d2 al al d2
E 17 d2 al d2 al
E 18 al dl t t
E 19 dl al t t
In the table, a "t" under a query indicates that a true value is
returned for the query. An "al" indicates that a record is duplicated
(added) and "dl" indicates that a record is deleted. Two al's in a
row indicates that the same record is duplicated in response to the
corresponding queries where the al's appear. The dl's are similar
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except that the same records are deleted. Some examples are given
below:
1. Row 1 in Table 3.2 corresponds to the case where true
responses are returned for all queries.
2. Row 2 in Table 3.2 corresponds to the case where true
responses are returned for queries q(C+T) and q(f ) , and the
same record is added when computing the responses to queries
q(C+T) and q(T)
.
3. Row 14 in Table 3.2 corresponds to the case where the same
record is added when computing the responses to queries
q(C+T) and q(T) , and the same record (possibly different
from the previous one) is deleted when computing the
response to queries q(C+f ) and q(f )
.
There are other ways by which compromise can occur. For example,
records may be duplicated in queries q(C+T) and q(C+T) and a record
having a data value equal to the sum of the data values in the
duplicated records may be duplicated in either q(T) or q(T). It is
assumed that the probabilities of such situations occurring are small
and hence are neglected.
The various conditions given in Table 3.2 are divided into six
groups A, B, C, D, E and F, in order to calculate the probability of
compromise. To write the probabilities for each group, let the query
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set sizes |q(C&T)|, |q(C&f)|, |q(C&T)| and |q(C&T)| be u, v, w and x
respectively. This is shown as a Venn diagram in Fig. 3.1.
Fig. 3.1. Venn diagram showing the query sets q(C&T),
q(C&f), q(C&T) and q(C&f)
w X
Let the probabilities that the conditions in groups A, B, C, D,
E, and F of Table 3.2 hold be p^, pb> pc> pd> Pg , and pf respectively.
Since the probability of returning the true response is p., p may be
written as:
4
Pa " P 3
The probability, pb> that the conditions in group B of Table 3.2 holds
is:
22 f 1
Pb " PlP 3 [ uTv
Similarly,
P„ =
u V
+ +w (u+v+x)(u+w) (u+v+w) (v+x) u+v+x
4
uvp
x
uvp,
c
"" (u+v+w) (u+v+x)
L
P l
+ P 2
+ (v+x) (u+w) + (v+x) (u+w)
J
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,221" 1 u v 1 1
Pd ™ ^2^3 [ u+v+w (u+v+x) (u+w) (u+v+w) (v+x) u+v+x J
2 2
ePQ
" 2p
1P 2
uv
(u+v+w ) (u+v+x ) (u+v+x ) (u+w ) (u+v+w ) (v+x
)
and
3 [ u+v ]
P f ~ ^P 1P 2P 3 [ (u+v+x) (u+v+w) J
The probability that a compromise occurs is:
P = Pa + Pb + P c + Pd + Pe + Pf
or
*-P3 + P3<Pl+P2>[u^v- + y + Y + ~J—+ +w (u+v+x) (u+w) (u+v+w) (v+x) u+v+x
uv. 2
+
2 2 r 1
^P l P2' I (u+v+w) (u+v+x) (u+v+x) (u+w) (u+v+w) (v+x)
o 2 r u+v i
P 1P 2P 3 I (u+v+x) (u+v+w)
In order to find the upper bound for the probability of
disclosure of an individual's confidential information, the following
relation may be written:
u + v - 1
Also, since q(C+T), C+T) " q(T) and q(T)"are answerable and by the
definition of general trackers, the following bounds are obtained:
k < |q(C+T)| < N-k or k < u+v+w < N-k
k <
| q (C+T) | < N-k or k < u+v+x < N-k
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2k < |q(T)| < N-2k or 2k < u+w < N-2k
2k < |q(T)| < N-2k or 2k < v+x < N-2k
If the probabilities for duplicating and deleting a record are equal
(- p) , then an upper bound for the probability of compromise may be
written as:
uv
P < (l-2p) 4 + 2(l-2p) 2p
2
f I + -^ + -^ + h] + 4P
4
[ H +1 K 2kz 2kz kZJ L kz 4k~
Since u+v=l, u>0, and v>0, either u or v must be 0. Therefore:
P < (l-2p) 4 + ^ (l-2p)
2 (4k+3) +
^f-k k
Optimum values for p for given values of k may be found from the above
equation. However, this involves solving the roots of a cubic
equation, which has three roots. To simplify the analysis, the values
of P were calculated for the optimum values of p obtained in the
analysis for individual trackers. The values of P obtained are given
in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3. Values of P for general trackers
k P P
1 0.4000 0.1488
2 0.4286 0.0431
3
. 4444 0.0216
4 0.4545 0.0107
5 0.4762 0.0087
10 0.4878 0.0023
20 0.4884 0.0006
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Comparing the values of P in Tables 3.1 and 3.3, it is clear that
the proposed scheme is very effective in avoiding compromise. It must
be mentioned that these are probabilities that an exact answer may be
computed by algebraically manipulating the query responses. However,
a user trying to obtain confidential information would not know when
the true answer is computed.
EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST DOUBLE TRACKERS
Double trackers were also discussed in the previous chapter.
These trackers were more powerful than general trackers. A double
tracker is a pair of characteristic formulas (T,U) satisfying:
V^
COUNT(T) is in the range [k,N-2k]
COUNT (U) is in the range [2k,N-k]
Any restricted query q(C) is found from:
q(C) - q(U) + q(C+T) - q(T) - q(C&T&U) for COUNT(C)<k
q(C) - q(U) - q(C+T) + q(T) + q(C&T&U) for COUNT(C)>N-k
Without loss of generality, only the the first of the last two
equations may be considered. To obtain the bounds on the probability
of compromise, the same assumptions made in the analysis of the
effectiveness of the proposed method against individual trackers is
made in this analysis also.
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The different ways in which compromise can occur is summarized in
Table 3.4. The format of the table is similar to the format of Table
3.2. The symbols in Tables 3.2 and 3.4 have the same meaning.
Table 3.4. Conditions under which compromise can occur when double
trackers are used to compromise the database
.
Group No. q(C+T) q(U) q(T) q(C&T&U)
A 1 t t t t
B 2 al t al t
B 3 t al al t
B 4 al t t al
B 5 t al t al
C 6 al a2 al a2
C 7 al a2 a2 al
C 8 dl d2 dl d2
C 9 dl d2 d2 dl
D 10 dl t dl t
D 11 t dl dl t
D 12 dl t t dl
D 13 t dl t dl
E 14 al d2 al d2
E 15 al d2 d2 al
E 16 d2 al al d2
E 17 d2 al d2 al
F 18 al dl a2 d2
F 19 dl al a2 d2
F 20 al dl d2 a2
F 21 dl al d2 a2
G 22 al dl t t
G 23 dl al t t
G 24 t t al dl
G 25 t t dl al
Table 3.4 is divided into seven groups A, B, C, D, E, F and G.
In order to write the probabilities of compromise for each group, let
the query set sizes |q(C&T)|, |q(C&U&T)|, |q(C&U)|, |q(C&T)|,
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|q(C&U&f)| and |q(C&U)| be u, v, w, x, y and z respectively. These
query set sizes are shown in Fig. 3.2.
Fig. 3.2. Venn diagram showing the query sets q(C&T)
,
q(C&U&T)
,
q(C&U), q(C&T), q(C&U&T) and q(C&U)
.
!<.__ u --->|<--u-->|
|<-T->|
u v | w
x y z
Let the probabilities that the conditions in groups A, B, C, D,
E, F, and G of Table 3.4 hold be p , p, , p , p,, p . p,., and p
a d c d. e r g
respectively. Following the same procedure as in calculating the
probabilities of compromise for general trackers, the following
equations are obtained:
Pa " P3
2 2f 1
" P 1P 3[ u+v+
v+x
w+x u+v+x+y (u+v+w+x) (v+x+y) u+v+x+y J
4 4
p l+p 2
4 4
(p 1
+p 2Mv+x )
(u+v+w+x ) (u+v+x+y ) (u+v+x+y ) (u+v+w+x ) (v+x+y
)
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2
2f
1 1 v+x 1 1
d P 2P 3 [ u+v+w+x u+v+x+y (u+v+w+x) (v+x+y) u+v+x+y J
,22 ,22
2p
1P 2
2Plp 2
pe (u+v+w+x) (u+v+x+y) (u+v+x+y) (u+v+w+x) (v+x+y)
/ 2 2 r4PlP 2
u+v+x
(u+v+x+y) (u+v+w+x) (u+x) (x+v+y)
2 f u+v+x
P„ - 2p Lp 2p 3g ^ly K
|
(u+v+x+y) (u+v+w+x) (u+x) (x+v+y)
The probability that a compromise occurs is:
P = Pa + Pb + Pc + Pd + Pd + Pe + P f + Pg
or
P-p* + (PJ+P2
2
)P^[ ^~. 1
v+x
u+v+w+x ' u+v+x+y (u+v+w+x) (v+x+y)
+
1
"I +
/ 2 2 2T 1
u+v+x+y
J
^
P l P 2^ (u+v+w+x) (u+v+x+y)
(v+x)
(u+v+w+x) (v+x+y) (u+v+x+y)
4
2 2 I"! (u+v+x )x "I
p lp 2
J
(u+v+x+y ) (u+v+w+x ) (u+x ) (x+v+y
)
2 2 T u+v+x x 1
P 1P 2P 3 [ (u+v+x+y) (u+v+w+x) (u+x) (x+v+y)
In addition, the following constraint holds if an individual's
confidential information is sought:
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U + V + w — 1
For the above queries to be answerable:
k < |q(T)| < N-2k or k < u+x < N-2k
2k < |q(U)| < N-k or 2k < u+v+x+y < N-k
k < |q(C+T)| < N-k or k < u+v+w+x < N-k
k < |q(C&f&U)| < N-k or k < v+x+y < N-k
If the probabilities for duplicating and deleting a record are equal
(- p) , then an upper bound for the probability of compromise may be
written as:
2k
or
P < (l-2p) 4 + I p
2 (l-2p) 2 + ^ p
4
k2
Once again, the values of P were calculated for the optimum values of
p obtained in the analysis for individual trackers. The values of P
obtained are given in Table 3.5.
Comparing the values of P in Tables 3.1, 3.3, and 3.5, it is
clear that the proposed scheme is very effective in avoiding
compromise. The value of P obtained for double trackers for k-1 is
higher than that for individual and general trackers. There is no
46
specific reason that may be given except that the bounds for P found
are not the least upper bounds and the method of calculating the upper
bounds affects the values of P obtained. In general, the probabality
of compromise is higher for double trackers than for general trackers
because the number of ways by which compromise occurs is higher, as
seen from tables 3.2 and 3.4.
Table 3.5. Values of P for double trackers,
k P P
1 0.4000 0.2128
2 0.4286 0.0679
3 . 4444 0.0335
4 0.4545 0.0199
5 0.4762 0.0133
10 0.4878 0.0035
20 0.4884 0.0009
STATISTICAL CONSEQUENCES
From the above analysis it is clear that the proposed scheme is
effective against the problem of trackers.
With any output perturbation scheme, one must be careful that the
response is not distorted to an extent that the response is not close
enough to the actual or true response to be useful.
A quantification of the loss in precision due to the proposed
strategy is given below.
Let the values of the data fields in n records of a query set be
X
l'
x
2
x
n
-
For the sake of brevity, the set (X-, X
2
X ) will
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be referred to as the query set. The following are two possibilities
with regard to the query sets:
Case I
.
The query set could be a random sample from some population
with the same characteristics queried and with a mean of y.
2
and a variance of a . An example of this possibility is a
public domain census database.
Case II. The query is the population in which case
ft - &X. - X
^ l-l 1
and
»
2
- i &<v*>
2
This corresponds to the case where the database includes the
whole population. This is the more common situation where
the database is for all the employees in an organization.
It is in this situation that compromise is more likely.
With the perturbation strategy y. is estimated as
A A A A
Ji = I
1a«1
+ l
2y2 + I3M3
where
^2 - (^17 (£§lXi • X*>
m, -
i Ax.
3 n i=l 1
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X^ is the data value deleted or duplicated in the proposed
method, and
,-{:
with probability p.
otherwise
I,_ + I
2
+ I
3
- 1
where
p,
, P2 and p_ are the probabilities of taking the option to
duplicate a record, delete a record or returning the true
A
response. Note that the I.'s and the p.'s are statistically
independent
.
A
The expected value of fi is
E00 = Edj/^) + E(I
2m2
) + E(I
3I3 ) .AAA
- E(I
1
)E(/i
1 )
+ E(I
2
)E(m
2 )
+ E(I
3
)E(m
3 )AAA
- PjECj^) + p 2e(m2 ) + p 3e(m3 )
For case I
E°° = P l (n+1) " + P 2 (nTT) MP 3 -/«
= M
For case II,
A -
E(P) = P X E(— [nAi + XJ) + p 2 E(^y [nM - X# ]) + p 3 E(M )
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Therefore, the estimator n is an unbiased estimator for \i under both
the cases.
A A
The accuracy of n is measured by the standard error of n. The
A
variance of fi is
Var(/0 = Var(I lMl ) + VarCI^) + Vard^) + ZCovtf^ , 1^)
A A A A
+ 2Cov(I2M2 ,I 3^ 3 ) + 2Cov(I 1 /i1 ,I 3 Ai3 )
Since, Ij+Ij+^-l, for i,j - 1,2 or 3 and i*j
Covd^.IjMj) - E(I. M .IjAtj ) - E(Iiii)E(Iji )
2
"
- PiPj M
and
Var(I. M .) = E((I.^.) 2 ) - (Ed.^)) 2
- E(I 2)E(i2 ) - P?M
2
- p.[Var(i.) + M
2
] - p
2
^
2
A
Hence, the variance of \i becomes
A /\
Var(M) = P
x
Var(Ml ) + p^
2
- p
2
^
2
+ p 2
Var(M
2
) + p^
2
- p
2
M
2
+
2 J- 2 o 2 o_ 2 „ 2
"3'P 3
Var(M3 ) + p 3^ - p3/i - 2Plp2M
^
- 2?^/ - 2p
2
p„,
- p 1
Var(/i
1 )
+ p2
Var(/i
2
) + p3
Var(/i
3 )
For case I,
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Var(Ml ) = Var(
-Jjj (.^X. + X*) )
-
—~—Z (na 2 + a 2 + 2Cov( £.X. ,X. )
)
(n+1) 2 ^1 V *>>
_
(n+3) 2
2
a
'
(n+ir
VarC^) = Var(^ (^X. - X*) )
-
l
2
(na 2 + a2 - 2Cov(2&
L
X. ,X#))
(n-1)
2
a
(n-1) '
a In
Var(/i,) - Var( - Ax. )^3' n i=-l l '
2
g
n
Using the relation p, - 1 - p. - p 2'
Var(i) = Pl a
2
^±^r + p ^ + p ^1 (n+1) 2 2 (n - 1} 3 n
2 \ „ (n+3) A _ 1 p l
+p
;
I
Pi
(n+1) 2
+ P2 (n-1) ' n J
+—
The first term in the above equation is the loss in precision due to
the proposed strategy for Case I.
As assumed previously, if p-,-p 9=p,
2
l (n+1) 2 <n
" 1
>
n J n
The standard error is
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SE(/0 = (7p(n+3)/(n+l)(n+l) + p/(n-l) - 2p/n + l/n)*a
The term f(n) = r + — - decreases with an increase in
L (n+l) 2 (n
' l) n J
the value of n. The loss in precision decreases as n increases. The
A
quantity of interest is | SE(^)
-a/Jn\ . Values of k (substituted for n)
and p from tables 3.1, 3.3, and 3.5 may be used to determine the loss
in precision due to the proposed strategy. The results summarized in
2
Table 3.6 are for a -1.
From Table 3.6, it may be concluded that the loss in precision is
small when the minimum query set size is large. From Tables 3.1, 3.3,
and 3.5, the probability of compromise is also small for larger values
of k. It must be pointed out that this study deals with control for
exact compromise and not statistical compromise. For larger values of
k, or large query set sizes, statistical compromise is very likely.
Table 3.6. Values of n, p, standard error and 1/,/n.
n P
A
SE(/i) l/7n
2 0.4286 0.8591 0.7071
3
. 4444 0.6526 0.5774
4 0.4545 0.5491 0.5000
5 0.4762 0.4841 0.4472
10 0.4878 0.3302 0.3162
20 0.4884 0.2288 0.2236
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For Case II,
n
"
+ X
* . a
1
-(.!) - Var(— , =_
n
" "
X
*
. a
2
Var(„
2
) = Var( -^y- ) - ^~
K
' (n-lT
Var(M
2
) =
Therefore,
Var(M) » p —2-— + Po —2-1 (n+lT ' (n-1)*
The above quantity is the penalty for not returning the true value
X=/i. Again, for the case when p,=p
2
-p, the above equation reduces to:
2 2
Var( M ) = -^-^ + -M
(n+1) 2 (n-1) 2
From the above equation, it is clear, that the penalty is higher for
o
"large" values of p and a and "small" values of n. The precision
estimates reflect the consequences for potentially adding or deleting
records far from the mean. This is ' reflected in a 2 . Also, the
greater the probability of choosing the option to duplicate a record
or delete a record, the chances of distorting the data is larger. The
distortion in the response is greater if a record is duplicated or
deleted for the case when the query set size is "small" than for the
case when the query set size is "large". The above equation
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quantifies the penalty paid when the proposed method is employed to
return query responses.
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Chapter IV
IMPLEMENTATION
STRATEGY
A method was proposed in Chapter III to avoid compromise of an
individual's confidential information. It was shown that the proposed
strategy was effective against trackers. In this chapter, an
implementation of the proposed strategy is given.
It is to be recalled that in the proposed scheme, there were
three options which may be chosen when responding to a query. It was
also pointed out that the same option must be taken for the same query
set regardless of how the query is formed; this is referred to as
condition 1. Also, for all such queries, a second condition is
required. The same record must be duplicated or deleted should the
option to duplicate or delete a record be chosen in condition 1. The
first condition can easily be implemented if a random number is
generated from the same seed from which to select the option. One
such seed is the query set size. This guarantees that the same option
is chosen for query sets having the same number of records.
To satisfy the second condition, an implementation could be to
use the same random number generated above to select the record to be
deleted/duplicated. An obvious strategy would be to delete/duplicate
a record by position in the query set. This would require that the
records come in the same order no matter how the query is created to
retrieve the same query set. The order in which records are retrieved
depends on the implementation of the database system used. Of
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interest were two database systems: INGRES and ORACLE. It seems clear
in [STON76] as to the order in which a standard INGRES implementation
should return the records in a query set; however, little could be
determined about ORACLE'S retrieval and query optimization algorithms.
Consequently, the database given in Table 2.1 was created in both
INGRES and ORACLE. It was established using this database and other
databases that so long as there was only one relation in the database
(as in the example of Table 2.1), the records in the query set were
always retrieved in the same order for a given query set no matter how
the query was formulated (or how the query set was characterized)
.
Thus, the following implementation is proposed:
(1) Determine the query set size, |q(C)|.
(2) If the query set size is not in the range [k,N-k] where k is a
chosen parameter and N is the number of records in the database,
then the query is invalid.
(3) Use the query set size to seed a random number generator.
(4) The random number generated, r, is used to select one of the
three options below:
(a) Duplicate a record in the query set.
(b) Delete a record from the query set.
(c) Do nothing to the query set.
Let the probabilities of choosing options (a), (b) and (c) be p 1 ,
P 2> and p 3 .
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(5) If the option chosen is (a) or (b) , then the same random number
generated in (3) is used to determine the record to be duplicated
or deleted. The query set is then modified by duplicating or
deleting the record chosen. If the option chosen is (c) , the
query set is not modified.
(6) Return the modified query set to the user.
EXAMPLES
A program was written in C using embedded EQUEL statements (see
Appendix A). The database given in Table 2.1 was used as a sample
database. For simplicity, the values of p 1 , p„ and p_ were chosen to
be equal (1/3). This program was used to determine the query
responses to the queries given in Chapter II for illustrating
trackers. It is assumed that the value of k is appropriately chosen.
The examples below show the results obtained.
Example 1 - Individual Trackers
To find the salary of Dodd (identified by the characteristic
Sex-F & Dept=CS & Position=Prof ) using individual trackers, the
formula was
:
SUM((Sex=F)&(Dept-CS)&(Position-Prof); Salary)
= SUM(Sex-F; Salary) -
SUM(((Sex-F)&(Dept-CS)&(PositI6n-Prof)); Salary)
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The option chosen for the query SUM(Sex=F; Salary) was to delete a
record; the record of Flynn was deleted. For the query SUM(((Sex=F) &
(Dept=CS) & (Position-Prof)); Salary), the option to delete a record
was chosen. The response was obtained by deleting the record of
Irons. Thus, an individual trying to calculate Dodd's salary would
get:
SUM((Sex=F)&(Dept=CS)&(Position-Prof) ; Salary)
- 68 - 72
-
-4K
Obviously, this is very different from Dodd's actual salary (15K)
.
Example 2 - General Trackers
Dodd's salary using general trackers could be found from the
algebraic manipulation of four queries:
SUM((Sex-F)&(Dept-CS)&(Position-Prof); Salary)
= SUM(((Sex-F)&(Dept=CS)&(Position=Prof)) + (Sex=M) ; Salary) +
SUM(((Sex=F)&(Dept=CS)&(Position=Prof)) + (Sex=M); Salary) -
SUM((Sex=M); Salary) - SUM((Sex=M) ; Salary)
The following result was obtained; the option taken for each of the
query is written within parenthesis.
SUM((Sex-F)&(Dept=CS)&(Position=Prof); Salary)
= 137 (Record of Engel duplicated) + 68 (Record of Flynn deleted)
- 104 (no change) - 68 (Record of Flynn deleted)
- 33K
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This response is also not Dodd's salary (15K).
Example 3 - Double Trackers
Dodd's salary was calculated using double trackers in chapter 2
from:
SUM((Sex=F)&(Dept-CS)&(Position-Prof) ; Salary)
- SUM( (Position-Prof) ;Salary)+
SUM( ( (Sex-F)&(Dept-CS)&(Position-Prof ) )+(Dept=Math) ; Salary)
- SUM((Dept-Math); Salary)
- SUM((Sex-F)&(Dept=CS)&(Position-Prof)&(Dept=Math)&
(Position-Prof) ; Salary)
The result obtained was:
SUM( (Sex-F)&(Dept-CS)&(Position-Prof ) ; Salary)
- 173 (Record of Dodd duplicated)
+ 65 (Record of Hayes deleted)
- 65 (Record of Hayes deleted)
- 173 (Record of Dodd duplicated)
=
For the above examples, the proposed strategy is effective
against trackers. In examples 1 and 3, a user would think that he/she
has uniquely identified Dodd because if the queries were COUNT queries
instead of SUM queries as written above, the result of the algebraic
manipulation would give a value of one. In the above examples
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however, the user can deduce that the result that is obtained is not
correct because it is not likely that Dodd would earn < dollars. It
must be pointed out that a statistician is still given close estimates
of population means. For example, the average salary of individuals
having the characteristic C = (Dept=Math) is $20.75K. The value
returned using SUM(Dept=Math; Salary)/COUNT(Dept=Math; Salary) , was
$21.67K.
The implementation procedure proposed seems very inexpensive as
compared to the methods of avoiding compromise presented in chapter
II. The procedure requires:
1. Determination of the query set size
2. The generation of the random number r.
3. Modulus procedure used twice.
4. Deletion/duplication.
All these are relatively inexpensive and as shown above, easy to
implement.
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Chapter V
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
CONCLUSIONS
Release of confidential information of an individual through
inference control in statistical databases, should be of interest to
many. An analysis of the various methods of compromise and some of
the techniques used to avoid/deter compromise allowed us to discover
that most of the methods were either too expensive to implement or
would allow compromise to occur under certain situations.
An inexpensive method to deter compromise using an output
perturbation technique has been proposed. In the method, the response
to a query is distorted by randomly duplicating a record in the query
set, randomly deleting a record in the query set, or returning the
true response. In the method proposed, the same record must be
deleted/duplicated or subjected to no change to the query set
regardless of how the query request for the query set is formed.
Statistically, it was shown that the proposed strategy was effective
against individual, general and double trackers. A statistical
analysis quantified the loss in precision in the output due to the
proposed strategy. An implementation of the proposed method was also
presented in Chapter IV. The implementation appears to be inexpensive
compared to the methods of avoiding compromise as discussed in Chapter
II.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
1. This study proposed a method to thwart the exact disclosure of
confidential information of an individual. Additional work needs
to be done to avoid disclosure of confidential information about
a group of individuals.
2. The implementation proposed, relies on the fact that records are
returned in the same order for a genuine query no matter how a
query set is formed. For databases having single relations, the
database system implementations we examined returned the records
in a fixed order. It was found that when there was more than one
relation involved in the satisfaction of a query, the order in
which records of individuals returned for a query set varied for
different queries describing the query set. Additional work
needs to be done to optimize the queries so that the records are
retrieved faster and in the same order for a query set.
3. Control of compromise by inferential methods is only one aspect
of the broader issue of information dissemination control. There
is a need to quantify (or measure) the security of computer
systems. There may be levels of security, and some may be
considered acceptable while others may not.
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APPENDIX A
A PROGRAM TO IMPLEMENT DISCLOSURE AVOIDANCE
/******************************************************************
This program is written to respond to queries by modifying
the query sets so that a person will not be able to get an
individual's confidential information.
*******************************************************
#define TRUE 1
#define FALSE
#include <string.h>
#include <math.h>
main()
{
char
int
int
int
##
##
##
##
##
name [11]
;
sal;
KOUNT;
number of records
:
/*
/*
the
char
float
float
float
float
int
Name of individual
Salary of individual
/* Query set size
/* Number of records in
scrambled version
Sex of individual
Actual total salary of
individuals in the query
set
scram_total_sal=0.000;/* Scrambled version of
the total salary
/* Average salary
/* Scrambled version of
sex[2];
total sal=0.000;
avg_sal
;
scram_avg_sal
;
/*
/*
index;
int
int
random
;
choice
int
char
i;
name_changed[ll]
;
int salary_changed=0
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
V
*/
*/
/* Initialization
strcpy(name_changed
,
"
");
ingres denning
range of p is pay_relation
/* Include the query
#include "wanted. c"
/* Find the query set size
/* The query set is stored in dummy
the average salary
/* Index into the query set
to duplicate/delete a
record
/* Random number generated
/* Option to delete (-2) or
duplicate(=l) or return
true value (=0)
/* Index to scan query set
/* Name of person whose
record is deleted/added
/* Salary of the person whose
record is deleted/added
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
V
*/
*/
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## range of d is dummy
## retrieve (KOUNT=count (d . salary)
)
/* Find a random number and decide which option to choose */
srand( (unsigned) KOUNT)
;
random = rand()
;
choice = random%3;
if (choice—2)
(
/* delete a record */
index - random% (KOUNT- 1) ; /* Index into query set */
number_of_records = KOUNT- 1; /* No. of records in the
modified query */
/* Delete the record whose index was calculated above */
i = 0;
## retrieve (name=d.#name, sal=d. salary)
## (
total_sal = total_sal + sal;
if (i!=index)
scram_total_sa'l = scram_total_sal + sal;
else
{
strcpy(name_changed, name);
salary_changed - sal;
)
i++;
## }
}
else
if (choice—1)
{
/* add a record */
index - random% (KOUNT- 1) ; /* Index of record to
be added */
number_of_records = KOUNT+1; /* No. of records in
the modified query
set */
/* Duplicate the record given by index */
i = 0;
## retrieve (name=d.#name, sal=d. salary)
## {
total_sal = total_sal + sal;
if (i!=index)
scram_total_sal = scram_total_sal + sal;
else
{
strcpy(name_changed, name);
salary_changed = sal;
scram_total_sal - scram total sal + sal*2 0-
}
'
i++;
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##
}
else
/* Report true response */
number_of_records = KOUNT;
## retrieve (name=d.#name, sal-d. salary)
## (
total_sal - total_sal + sal;
## }
scram_total_sal = total_sal;
}
## destroy dummy
/* Calculate the average values (true value) for the salary */
if (KOUNT != 0)
avg_sal = (float) total_sal/(float) KOUNT;
else
avg_sal =
;
/* Calculate the average values (scrambled) for the salary */
if (number_of_records != 0)
scram_avg_sal = (float) scram_total_sal/(float)
number_of_records
;
else
scram_avg_sal - 0;
/* Print the results */
printf(" TRUE VERSION \n");
printf(" Number of records = %d\n" , KOUNT)
;
printf(" Average salary = %f\n" ,avg_sal)
;
printf(" Total salary - %f\n", total sal);
printf("\n");
printf(" SCRAMBLED VERSION - DELETE / ADD / NO CHANGE \n");
printf(" Number of records = %d\n" ,number_of_records)
;
printf(" Average salary = %f\n" , scram_avg_sal)
;
printf(" Total salary = %f\n", scram total sal)
•
printf("\n");
if (choice-=2)
{
printf(" Record corresponding to %s was DELETED. Salary was
%d\n"
,
name_changed, salary_changed)
;
printf("\n");
}
else
if (choice=l)
{
printf(" Record corresponding to %s was ADDED. Salary
was %d\n"
,
J
name_changed, salary_changed)
;
71
printf("\n")
;
}
else
printf(" NO CHANGE in reporting the query
.
\n\n" )
;
printf("\n")
;
printf ( "********************************************\n" )
j
printf("\n\n");
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ABSTRACT
Release of confidential information of an individual through
inference control in statistical databases should be of interest to
many. An analysis of the various methods of compromise and some of
the techniques used to avoid/deter compromise allowed us to discover
that most of the methods were either too expensive to implement or
would allow compromise to occur under certain situations.
An inexpensive method to deter compromise using an output
perturbation technique has been proposed. In the method, the response
to a query is distorted by randomly duplicating a record in the query
set, randomly deleting a record in the query set, or returning the
true response. In the method proposed, the same record must be
deleted/duplicated or subjected to no change to the query set
regardless of how the query request for the query set is formed.
Statistically, it was shown that the proposed strategy was effective
against individual, general and double trackers. A statistical
analysis quantified the loss in precision in the output due to the
proposed strategy. An implementation of the proposed method was also
presented. The implementation appears to be inexpensive compared to
the methods of avoiding compromise presented in the literature.
